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Political discourse in post-digital societies 
Jan Blommaert 
 
Abstract: The nature of political discourse has changed in societies in which digital media 
have become part of social structure. Forms of political discourse analysis need to follow. I 
discuss three fundamental challenges for contemporary online-offline political discourse 
analysis in this paper. 
 
Point of departure 
The point of departure for what follows is this observation.1 Since the beginning of the 21st century, 
we live our social, cultural, political and economic lives in an online-offline nexus, in which both 
‘zones’ – the online and the offline – can no longer be separated and must be seen as fused into a 
bewildering range of new online-offline practices of social interaction, knowledge exchange, 
learning, community formation and identity work. The so-called ‘digital revolution’ has already 
happened, it has become ‘historical’ according to Florian Cramer (2014), and we have entered a 
‘post-digital’ era in which big-tech innovation is matched by grassroots searches for agency, DIY 
media creation and hybrid media systems.  
This has profoundly affected the flows of information in societies such as ours, and we need to get 
our heads around these new ways in addressing their outcomes: messages, meanings and the social 
configurations within which they circulate. This evidently includes political messages and meanings. 
Note that such messages and meanings are almost without exception mediatized (and thus 
mediated) messages and meanings, reaching their audiences due to the mediating impact of media 
systems. For most people, political discourse is indirectly accessed through the specter of the media 
they are exposed to. 
One can reformulate this general observation. Digital infrastructures have become part of what is 
conventionally described as ‘social structure’ – the deep, generic and often invisible drivers behind 
actual social conduct – and such infrastructures now demand much more attention in research on 
messages and meanings (cf. Arnaut, Karrebaek & Spotti 2017). Concretely: not just the content 
should be central to discourse-analytic research, but systems of communication and the way in 
which they shape new sociolinguistic conditions for production, circulation and uptake of discourses, 
new resources, new actors and new relations between actors (Maly 2018). Post-digital environments 
are new sociolinguistic environments and discourse analysis cannot avoid attention to the 
sociolinguistic conditions affecting contemporary discourses. 
The point of departure has been sketched. I shall now offer three connected reflections on the 
analysis of political discourse within these post-digital conditions. 
 
                                                          
1 This essay is the written version of the opening statement of a Babylon webinar on this topic, held on 25 
November 2019 and involving audiences from Brazil, Argentina and Australia. I am grateful to all participants 
for the very stimulating discussion we had during the webinar.  
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Revisiting propaganda models 
Propaganda models are linear models of political mass communication, in which the messages and 
meanings of powerful actors – politicians in this case – are passed on to ‘the public’ by mass media 
owned or operated by actors sharing the same interests as those articulated by the powerful actors. 
Mass media, in such models, act as an intensifying and expansive conduit for the interests of the 
powerful, and their monopoly in the public sphere ensures propaganda effects on ‘public opinion’.   
Various versions of propaganda models (the most widely known one is Herman & Chomsky 1988) 
have been predominant in critical discussions of mass media and politics throughout the 20th 
century,2 and they informed much early and influential work in Critical Discourse Analysis as well 
(e.g. Fairclough 1989). These models are grounded in a modernist imagination of ‘the public’ (hence 
the scare quotes I put around this term) and the public sphere, in which ‘the public’ is usually seen 
as ‘the masses’. The latter are amorphous and inert – therefore vulnerable to propaganda – and 
coinciding with the statistical notion of ‘population’, which allowed it to be investigated by means of 
notions such as ‘public opinion’ and to be structured into averages, majorities and minorities. As a 
political actor, ‘the public’ stood in a responsive relationship to politicians and state institutions on 
the one hand, and mass media on the other.  
These often implicitly held images have been pervasive in spite of the fact that most serious 
sociologists (from Simmel and Dewey to Habermas, Bourdieu and Giddens) would frequently warn 
against the fallacies of such amorphous and homogenizing views of ‘the public’ and ‘the public 
sphere’. And attempts such as those of Dewey and Habermas to make citizens less responsive and 
inert, and more proactive and influential in the political process, often got no further than proposals 
for more structured, well-informed, rational debate in ‘the public sphere’.  
We now realize that this public sphere is profoundly fragmented. I suppose it always was 
fragmented, but the mainstream sociological imagination privileged artificial homogenization over 
actual fragmentation. In the online-offline nexus, we definitively must abandon this construct of a 
single and unified public sphere made up of ‘the masses’ and manipulated by the ‘mass media’. In 
the new hybrid media system in which old and new media constantly interact, algorithms do not 
target ‘the masses’, they target a multitude of highly specific audiences (‘micro-populations’ in the 
terms of Maly & Varis 2016) in what has become known as ‘micromarketing’ or ‘niche marketing’. 
‘Mass’ effects – think of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US president – 
are achieved by establishing loose, temporal and unstable coalitions between such micro-audiences. 
‘Mass’ media in the 20th century sense of the term (currently called ‘mainstream media’ or MSM) 
now also operate on the logic of micromarketing algorithms and in close synergy with online 
platforms and social media. They are no longer hegemonic in the ‘public sphere’ in the ways that led, 
e.g., Lipmann and Dewey to their reflections on the role of media in a democracy. And 
manufacturing consent in the way Herman and Chomsky understood it now demands intense and 
                                                          
2The debate between Lippman (1922) and Dewey (1927) can serve as an example. The debate structured two 
major lines of argument regarding the connection between politics, media as information providers, and the 
public, a pessimistic line and an optimistic one, respectively. These lines provide an accurate heuristics for 
following 20th century debates on the role and place of media in western democracies. Obviously, the views of 




coordinated activity on far more and more diverse media platforms, operating in a fragmented field 
of media content production and circulation. 
I’m afraid that the public sphere – a phrase that has been used a zillion times in social and political 
analysis – has become practically meaningless. And the propaganda models that were so 
predominant in public discourse analysis also need to be fundamentally revisited, because two of 
their key elements have been dislodged: mass media in the 20th century sense, and the public sphere 
in the modernist sense outlined above. They have been replaced by complex systems of 
communication aimed at micromarketing. 
As for rational debate within this public sphere – the duty of democratic citizens and the task of their 
mass media in the eyes of generations of social and political theorists – the same conclusion seems 
compelling. If propaganda models need to be replaced by micromarketing models of public 
communication, the features of marketing need to be taken serious. I shall now recite the 
commonplace features of such marketing practices: they are irrational, aestheticized and emotive. 
But let’s note with some emphasis that these features were already attributed to Nazi politics by 
Walter Benjamin in 1936. It is safe to assume that aesthetics has never been absent from the 
political sphere, and that it may even be one of its key features in retrospect. Let us equally note 
that these features, while not rational, are epistemic nonetheless: they organize modes of 
knowledge construction, of argumentation and persuasion just as effectively as rational, fact-based 
practices (cf. Blommaert 2018a; Prochazka & Blommaert 2019). Meaning is as much an effect of 
discursive shape as it is of discursive content, as Dell Hymes (1996) famously reminded us. Clickbait 
simply reaffirms this, as does the prominence of ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ (or outright lies) 
in contemporary political campaigns. 
The implications of all of this are clear, and I will quickly sketch three major ones. All three are 
related to how we imagine the democratic system as an actually existing contemporary mode of 
organization of the political field. 
First, we need to abandon the (cherished) idea of modern democracy as a rational system of 
decision-making, revolving around ‘the truth’ and with this ‘truth’ as the point around which 
consensus (and coalitions) can be formed. Few issues are presently as controversial as ‘the truth’, 
and commentators sometimes refer to our times as the ‘post-truth’ era. In actual practice, it is best 
to approach democratic decision-making as a ‘mixed method’ thing in which rational practices are 
just one element, and not always the prevailing one.  
Second, we also need to distance ourselves from traditional views of contemporary democratic 
decision-making as carried along by relatively stable (and sociologically pre-defined) majorities 
engaged in rational debate with equally relatively stable minorities. And third, we need to distance 
ourselves from the idea of ‘public opinion’ as a reliable indicator of such majority-minority divisions.  
Both elements – the majority-minority divisions and the notion of public opinion – too often operate 
as unchallenged a priori assumptions in analysis. In times of micromarketing and fragmented 
audiences, such assumptions need to be empirically demonstrated if we wish to get a precise view of 
the actual political process and the role of discursive action in that process. If we take these three 
implications on board, we are facing a more general one. An adequate understanding of the 
contemporary political system requires another sociological imagination (cf. Blommaert 2018b), for 
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the one we tend to carry along in our analyses reflects a political process that might have been 
accurate in the 20th century, but no longer corresponds to the field that prevails today. 
Revisiting models of communication 
I can now turn to the second reflection. It is, obviously, connected to the previous one and can be 
seen as a more specific extension of it of particular immediacy for discourse analysts. Here, too, my 
remarks address deep and influential assumptions often implicitly articulated in analysis – 
assumptions about the model of communication underlying analysis.3  
I shall start from something which all of us learned during our first year of language studies: 
Saussure’s sender-receiver model of communication (Saussure 1960: 27). (See Figure 1) 
 
 
Figure 1: Saussure’s model of communication 
 
We see two (male) individual humans, A and B; A produces an utterance originating in his brain and 
transmits it through his mouth to the ears of B, who processes it in his brain and responds to it. Both 
A and B perform these acts synchronically (in a real moment of interaction) and symmetrically: the 
acts of A and B are identical in Saussure’s model. All of this is very well-known, but we should remind 
ourselves that this simply dyadic sender-receiver model is, to a large extent, still the default model 
for imagining communication at large, and thus serves as the backdrop for communication 
theorizing. Note: it is individual, human, spoken, linear, synchronic and direct within a clear sender-
receiver relationship. 
With this in mind, let us turn to the actual contemporary forms of communication in the post-digital 
era. Here is the main structure of communication on Twitter. (See figure 2) 
                                                          




Figure 2: Communication structure on Twitter 
We see a very different and much more complex structure of communication here. The tweet, 
produced by someone (e.g. president Trump), is sent to an algorithm – a nonhuman ‘receiver’, if you 
wish – through which artificial intelligence operations forward it to numerous specific audiences (A 
1, 2, …n in figure 3), whose responses are fed back, as data, to the algorithm and thence to the 
sender of the tweet in nonstop sequences of indirect, mediated interaction. Parts of these audiences 
can relay their own uptake of the tweet (via the Twitter algorithm) to secondary audiences (A 5, 6 … 
n in the scheme), who can do the same – and so on, enabling a tweet to reach audiences not initially 
accessible, both immediately after the moment of tweeting and much later. The audiences (also 
often called ‘bubbles’) are constructed by the algorithms out of users’ data-yielding profiles, and 
they are selected on the basis of a range of ‘data points’ including topic keywords, hashtags and 
histories of prior interactions. The audiences consist of individuals, sure; but in the case of Trump 
and many other high-profile accounts also of bots – computer programs behaving like ‘normal’ 
Twitter users and generating specific forms of response such as liking and retweeting and sometimes 
dramatically increasing the volume of traffic for tweets.   
What we need to take along here is this: 
(1) There is no linear, symmetrical and direct sender-receiver structure on Twitter, because 
the platform itself provides an algorithmic mediator for all and any interaction. 
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(2) The participants are, consequently, not all human, as very crucial parts of the 
communication structure are controlled by automated AI technologies.  
(3) As an effect of these algorithmic mediations, there is not a single ‘audience’ (or ‘public’) 
in the structure of communication, but a fragmented complex of ‘niched’ audiences often 
with incompatible interests or political orientations. 
(4) There is also not a single producer of discourse here: political discourse is produced and 
circulated by all actors within this model, humans as well as non-humans. 
(5) The entire system is permanently in motion, with constant interactional conversions of 
actions performed by (human and nonhuman) participants into data further shaping and 
regulating the effects of the actions (cf. Maly 2018). 
(6) These actions are indirect, i.e. mediated by technologies as well as by the uptake and 
feedback actions of (unknown and unintended) audiences. 
(7) They are also not synchronic but spread over variable spans of time. Actions can be 
performed months or years after the original moment of tweeting, because of the archiving 
capacity of online platforms. 
(8) Finally, we are observing scripted communication here, not spoken communication. We 
are in a field of literacy here; this field is extraordinarily diverse and involves, for instance, 
different kinds of platforms on which literacy practices are performed. The conversion of all 
actual online practices into data, to be used in AI and in micromarketing, must be included 
into this. 
These are empirical observations, and specific ones. But even if we would prefer to minimalize their 
potential for extrapolation and generalization (something I would not encourage), these 
observations do not in any way fit into Saussure’s old model of communication, nor can they be 
made to fit into it. The model is simply irrelevant as a tool to generalize the actual modes of 
communication we face when looking at these types of examples.  
Models of communication in the post-digital era need to be models in which the characteristics of 
the online-offline nexus are absorbed as a reality affecting the phenomenology of communication in 
the most profound sense. This is, I think, a matter of realism in scientific practice: the frameworks 
for generalization we use need to be grounded in empirical analytical insights reflecting the ‘is’ of 
communication, not its ‘ought’. More concretely, political discourse analysis needs to be re-footed 
on the basis of the new kinds of communicative economies (including resources, actors and 
relationships between actors) we observe and inhabit. 
A polycentric world of communication 
The latter remark takes us back to what was said earlier: political communication in post-digital 
environments involves a multitude of actors, some of whom are human and some non-human, and 
all of whom operate both as producers and receivers of political messages. The idea that political 
discourse is the discourse of professional politicians alone, or even primarily, is an anachronism. 
True, politicians often provide the ‘input’ for the complex communication processes outlined in the 
previous section; but they do not determine its effects, intensity or scale of circulation – things 
performed by the multiple audiences (including bots) in interaction with platform algorithms. Here, 
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too, we can observe the limits and inadequacies of the older propaganda models: demonstrating 
that ‘the public’ is ‘influenced’ by politicians’ political messages – in which the politician (and his/her 
messages) is the key actor – nowadays requires a very intricate analysis of ‘who does what’. 
Outcomes of such analyses might suggest that parts of the public influence other parts of that public, 
or more precisely: they might suggest that not politicians, but specific audiences influence other 
audiences, and that this is achieved by means of a multitude of processes of re-entextualization 
(Silverstein 1996). 
Entextualization refers to the process by means of which discourses are successively or 
simultaneously decontextualized and metadiscursively recontextualized, so that they become a new 
discourse associated to a new context and accompanied by a particular metadiscourse which 
provides a sort of ‘preferred reading’ for the discourse. This key concept helps us understand that 
‘virality’ – the large-scale distribution of messages by means of online ‘copy’ practices such as 
reposts, retweets and so forth – is not, in fact, a series of repetitions of ‘the same’ message, but a 
series of re-entextualizations (cf Varis & Blommaert 2015). In such re-entextualizations, the message 
of a politician is taken by an audience member – it is appropriated, if you wish – and inserted into an 
entirely new act of communication involving a new producer (the audience member) and addressees 
(the audience member’s own network of online ‘friends’ or ‘followers’) in a new kind of interaction, 
with the algorithms mediating this new and more complicated process, the ‘data’ of which are fed 
back to the politicians’ original act of communication, even if the characteristics of the new act of 
communication diverge strongly from those of the original (‘input’) act. 
Concretely, imagine that I retweet a tweet launched by president Trump. I am not one of Mr. 
Trump’s supporters; in fact, I’m highly critical of his presidency and I became a ‘follower’ of Mr. 
Trump’s Twitter account because it offers me plenty of powerful arguments to be critical. My 
retweet would reach a network of people broadly aligned with my views (my bubble), and it is likely 
that this specific audience of mine will understand my retweet as a critical comment on Mr. Trump, 
not as an act of support for him and his views. My retweet, in short, is a re-entextualization that 
conveys a negative message on Mr. Trump, not the positive one articulated in lots of other retweets 
(and preferred, one dares to venture, by Mr. Trump himself). But the Twitter algorithm will add my 
retweet to the total ‘virality’ of Mr. Trump’s original tweet, allowing him and his supporters to 
interpret my act as a form of popular support for (and possibly even agreement with) Mr. Trump’s 
message. 
We observe polycentricity here: the circulation of political messages in the online-offline nexus does 
not, in any way, allow us to attach one single interpretation to that meaning. Sixty thousand 
retweets of Mr. Trump’s message cannot be read as sixty thousand acts of support and agreement – 
widely divergent interpretations will be included in what looks like simple repetitions of the same 
message. Observe (but I can only mention this in passing here) that new interpretations can be 
added much later, given the archival capacity of the Web: the tweets can be invoked as evidence in 
litigation, for example, or as evidence of contradictions or unconventional policy shifts by the 
president. Online messages inevitably end up in a system of communication in which the actually 
communicated meaning of such messages is open to very profound indexical re-orderings and, 
hence, of very different readings depending on the kinds of appropriations mentioned above.  
Explanations for this can be found in the Twitter model of communication I sketched above: we are 
facing nonlinear, asymmetrical and non-synchronic acts of communication here, involving different 
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‘indexical centers’ (cf. Blommaert 2005). In the example I gave, I am such an indexical center for my 
own Twitter audience, and the indexical order I apply to Mr. Trump’s message will be very different 
from that attributed to it by supporters of the president, who represent another range of indexical 
centers. The algorithms, of course, are also very powerful indexical centers in the entire process. In 
each instance, entirely different sets of social, cultural and moral norms will be applied to the 
messages, and what such messages actually do in communication will depend on such widely 
divergent norms (cf. Blommaert 2019). 
This feature of political (and other) communication in the post-digital era is yet another argument 
against simple propaganda models. Politicians quite often understand the numbers of retweets as 
well as the numbers of ‘followers’ or ‘friends’ of their social media accounts as evidence of the level 
of popular (often called ‘democratic’) support they command – an anachronistic reading grounded in 
the propaganda model and very much at odds with the actual facts of communication, uptake and 
effect of their messages. As said earlier, there is no way in which we can see online audiences as yet 
another embodiment of ‘the masses’ in the 20th century, modernist sense of that term. 
Good and bad news for discourse analysts 
The last reflection has a clear implication: politicians need to be aware of the widely divergent 
meanings that their messages allow, and need to spend a great deal of care for the actual forms of 
communication they engage in. Advanced big-data based micromarketing assists them in the 
process, but messages targeting specific audiences still have the capacity to spill over into 
unintended audiences and generate a powerful negative backlash that way. Remember that the 
ultimate aim is to construct (temporary and ephemeral, but real) coalitions of different audiences; 
negative backlash from unintended audiences can render the construction of such coalitions more 
difficult or impossible. 
All of this is good news for political discourse analysts. It is also bad news. The good news is that the 
increased attention for actual forms of political communication creates a demand for nonstop, 
intensive and sophisticated discourse analysis. I did my PhD in 1989 on Swahili political discourse in 
Tanzania. In those days, our material consisted of a finite body of texts – speeches given and texts 
written by politicians, possibly complemented by mass-media reports of such speeches and texts. 
Political discourse analysis today is much more exciting, for accurate analysis now involves the 
capacity to change analytical strategies whenever the field and its constituent elements change – 
and this is now a permanent process. 
This, of course, can also be seen as bad news. The toolkit with which I engaged with my Tanzanian 
texts in the 1980s was outstanding in its usefulness and clarity – we had standard ‘recipes’, so to 
speak, for doing the work of political discourse analysis. We no longer have the comfort of such 
clarity, for political discourse analysis, as just mentioned, now includes perpetual adjustment of 
perennially unfinished tools and tactics to adequately address a moving target. This challenge is 
theoretical, methodological, but also practical. Political discourse analysis is of crucial importance if 
we want to understand the complexities of the societies we inhabit. So there is not just a demand 
for such analysis but a need to continue providing it. The fact that this work becomes more difficult 
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